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The Alcohol Harm Reduction Strategy
for England, published a decade ago [1],
was at that time criticised as being ‘‘a
recipe for ineffectiveness…a textbook case
of how industry interests can be brought to
bear, through an ideologically friendly
central government’’ [2]. The key criticism
was that evidence-based policies of dem-
onstrated effectiveness were ignored in
favour of policies preferred by the alcohol
industry [3,4]. The resulting mix of
approaches—industry self-regulation, tar-
geting binge drinkers with largely punitive
responses, public information, and school-
based education—has not reduced alcohol
harms. In fact, the situation has continued
to worsen in England, with rates of
alcohol-related hospital admissions ap-
proximately doubling within one decade
[5]. Other key indicators such as liver
disease death rates have also risen mark-
edly, during a period in which they have
been falling in many other western
European countries [6].
The 2012 government alcohol strategy
[7] for England was widely welcomed by
the public health community because it
announced the key policy measure of
minimum unit pricing (MUP), despite
otherwise having strong continuities with
the ineffective approaches previously taken
[8]. However, the following year saw a
government U-turn on MUP [9], leaving
little policy in place that can be claimed to
embody meaningful strategic intent [10].
What might be termed a ‘‘lost decade’’ in
alcohol policy in England contrasts with
the situation in Scotland, where an
evidence-based approach to alcohol policy
has developed, with industry influence
appropriately balanced [11–13]. Even so,
the alcohol industry has successfully de-
layed implementation of MUP in Scotland
through appeals against legal decisions
within the European Union [14], mimick-
ing the tactics of the tobacco industry [15].
Policy Forum articles provide a platform for health
policy makers from around the world to discuss the
challenges and opportunities in improving health
care to their constituencies.
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Summary Points
N National alcohol policies that exclude evidence-based whole-population
measures because of lobbying by the alcohol industry are likely to increase
rather than reduce alcohol harms.
N Corporate capture of the idea of ‘‘harm reduction’’ has been used by the
industry to counter effective evidence-based alcohol policy development.
N The concept of alcohol harm reduction needs to be redefined to include the full
range of evidence-based measures that reduce alcohol harms to public health
and society.
N The ability of the alcohol industry to shape alcohol policy nationally and
globally needs to be curtailed because of a fundamental conflict of interest with
reducing alcohol harms.
N The WHO Global Strategy to Reduce the Harmful Use of Alcohol offers an
evidence-based public health approach that can be used by national
governments.
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The Nature of Harm Caused by
Alcohol and the Evidence on
How It Should Be Reduced
Environmental factors, including those
relating to history and culture, and
alcohol-specific and broader social policies
are responsible for both levels of drinking
and the accompanying health, social, and
economic harms [16]. Alcohol consump-
tion is now understood to be a component
cause of more than 200 health problems
[16]. The World Health Organization
(WHO) estimates that alcohol accounts
for approximately 6% of all deaths,
making it a leading contributor to the
global burden of disease [16]. Harm
increases with consumption, but the rela-
tionship varies by outcome, and with the
drinker’s age and sex. For example, at a
population level, any consumption elevates
risk for injury and hypertension, and for
several common cancers [17]. For rectal
cancer, risk remains low with even heavy
consumption for men, but it increases
exponentially with alcohol consumption
for women [17]. In addition to organ
damage, alcohol intoxication and depen-
dence are the key causes of harm [18].
There is much unexplained heterogeneity
in findings of health benefits of small doses
of alcohol, which have attracted contro-
versy for decades [19–21]. It has been
suggested that there are unresolved meth-
odological problems in observational co-
hort studies that have investigated these
associations [22,23], and a recent Mende-
lian randomisation study found no evi-
dence of any cardiovascular benefit caused
by alcohol [24]. Overall, alcohol con-
sumption produces major harm, even
taking into account any possible health
benefits [16].
Risk is not confined to subgroups.
Consequently, there is a need for whole-
population countermeasures [25]. System-
atic reviews of the effects of more than 40
types of alcohol policies and programmes
consistently show that increasing price and
restricting physical availability of alcohol
are effective supply-side strategies for
reducing alcohol-related harm [18]. On
the demand side, substantially limiting the
promotion of alcohol and employing
strategies to reduce drunk driving (e.g.,
random breath testing) are effective [18].
Education and persuasion have been
found to be ineffective, particularly when
used in isolation, without supply-side
controls [18]. Targeted harm reduction
efforts have been shown to be modestly
effective and cost-beneficial [26], and need
to be complemented by policies that
reduce harms across the population as a
whole [18].
Harm Reduction and Alcohol
The approach of harm reduction has
been important in developing the science,
policies, and practice of working with
injection drug use at both the individual
and population levels [27,28]. The influ-
ential International Harm Reduction As-
sociation (IHRA; also more recently
known as Harm Reduction International),
which combines science and advocacy,
officially broadened its focus in 2004 to
encompass alcohol and tobacco. In seek-
ing to challenge mainstream public health
thinking that reducing population alcohol
consumption is critical to reducing harm,
it’s advocacy of targeted interventions was
appealing to the alcohol industry, and a
close relationship ensued (see Box 1).
The IHRA specifically promotes reduc-
ing harm by means other than reducing
consumption [29]. This approach to
alcohol stems from the context of illicit
drugs and punitive drug policies, in which
the individual’s right to use drugs is
defended against attempts at drug control
[30]. There is a crucial ambiguity in harm
reduction discourse, namely, whether the
construct should be defined in terms of the
methods used or the objectives or both,
with the IHRA definition preoccupied
with methods (not reducing consumption)
at the expense of objectives [31]. There
are key differences between current and
earlier IHRA definitions of harm reduc-
tion [32], and one key text on alcohol
harm reduction [33] notes that ‘‘most of
the strategies…require a reduction in
alcohol intake for their effect’’ [34]. Here
we concentrate on harm reduction at the
population level (see [35] for a guide to
individual-level applications).
Mere advocacy of harm reduction,
without measurement of impact, has been
criticised, including by those who are
sympathetic to the aims of reducing drug
harms [36]. The critics are dissatisfied
with the multiple meanings afforded by
the concept and the lack of attention to
quantifying harms [37]. There is also a
tendency to conflate harm reduction with
public health, rather than seeing harm
reduction as one component therein, and
it has been suggested that the term be
abandoned in favour of describing the
strategies used [38,39]. Differentiation of
harm reduction from abstinence-focused
Box 1. One Example of the Association between the Harm
Reduction Movement and the Alcohol Industry
The International Center for Alcohol Policies (ICAP) was a Washington-based
organisation that was set up in 1995 by ten of the world’s largest distilled spirits
and beer marketers to counter the alcohol policy direction of WHO [40]. Internal
documents from Phillip Morris (which then owned Miller Brewing and which
retains a significant shareholding in the merged SAB-Miller [59]) revealed that
they formed ICAP with the explicit objective of influencing policy [40]. ICAP is one
of a range of alcohol industry bodies with which the IHRA has worked.
An ICAP and IHRA collaboration produced a book in 2007 [60] that was strongly
criticised in leading specialist [43] and general medical [61] journals. One critic
saw it as a disingenuous ‘‘smoke and mirrors’’ attempt to distract attention away
from effective population-level policies [43]. Directly targeting sub-populations
was presented as preferable to whole-population measures, with many of the
proposed interventions lacking effectiveness data. Another critic suggested the
IHRA had been ‘‘hooked in’’ and that it was ‘‘ill judged for the association to be
linked to this lobbying exercise of the alcohol industry…. [T]he harm reduction
movement needs clear blue water between itself and the alcohol industry’’ [61].
Critics argued that the approach advocated was likely to increase rather than
reduce harm. For example, pregnant women may be targeted in order to prevent
foetal alcohol spectrum disorders. Such an approach ignores the wider need to
address alcohol consumption among young women (and men), which can
decrease both alcohol-related pregnancies and drinking during the early stages of
pregnancy, thereby reducing the prevalence of foetal alcohol spectrum disorders
[43]. The alcohol industry has a vested interest in avoiding population-level
policies that are expected to reduce consumption and, by extension, sales and
profits.
In April 2014, the merger of ICAP with the Global Alcohol Producers Group was
announced [62], and in October 2014, the name of the new organisation was
presented as the International Alliance for Responsible Drinking.
Alcohol harm reduction
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drug policy is understandable, particularly
in relation to illegal drug use, where
serious harms can flow from prohibition.
However, it is unclear why such emphasis
might be placed on distinguishing harm
reduction from use reduction for alcohol,
when reducing consumption so clearly
reduces harm.
Such critiques [31,32,34,36–39,43,61]
have made no obvious dent in the position
of the IHRA or in their collaboration with
the alcohol industry. The most recent
alcohol harm reduction conference spon-
sored by the International Center for
Alcohol Policies (ICAP; an organisation
originally formed by ten of the world’s
leading beer and spirits producers [40])
advocated the local responses favoured by
industry in contrast to national policies
that are antithetical to industry interests
[41]. This orientation has also led to new
‘‘city health’’ conferences identifying city-
level responses in the face of national
policy inertia [42]. However, municipal
policies should be designed to complement
national public health policies, particularly
as some key actions are necessarily nation-
al, for example, restricting television
marketing. To present municipal and
national policies as alternatives creates a
false dichotomy, similar to counterposing
consumption reduction and harm reduc-
tion [43].
Corporate Capture
Corporate capture refers to the process
by which corporations deliberately at-
tempt to ‘‘dominate the information
environment, so they can significantly
affect decision-making’’ [44]. This may
be achieved by managing access to, and
use of, evidence by filtering it through key
trusted sources such as think tanks [45] in
an attempt to marginalise independent
evidence. Generating doubt about the
nature of the independent evidence is a
key strategy of the alcohol industry and
other corporate sectors, as doubts among
policy-makers will restrict the actions they
take [46]. Tobacco companies were the
original ‘‘merchants of doubt’’ [47], with
this strategy subsequently adopted by the
ideologically motivated opposition to en-
vironmental protection. Organisations
linked to the alcohol industry (including
ICAP) have produced a competing alter-
native literature in order to undermine the
use of established, independent, peer-
reviewed science [40,45]. More specific
tactics used include misrepresenting un-
favourable strong evidence and promoting
favourable weak evidence [48]. This
deliberate moulding of the evidence, or
‘‘bending science’’ [49], shapes ideas and
influences perceptions of data by the
public and policy-makers, and ideas are
more important in influencing policy than
evidence [50]. In this ‘‘ideas’’ world, the
idea of harm reduction is appealing, and
also attractively vague and malleable. This
allows industry to claim there is disagree-
ment within the field of public health [51],
while providing a plausible rhetoric to give
apparent legitimacy to resisting popula-
tion-level evidence-based policies.
The libertarian strand of harm reduc-
tion thus ends up in close proximity to the
neo-liberal ideas favoured by corporations,
with both arguing (albeit for different
reasons) that the state should not interfere
in people’s lives. In the ‘‘ideas’’ arena,
effectiveness evidence is demoted to being
just another consideration [43], and ac-
tions taken to promote public health are
caricatured as ‘‘nanny state’’ paternalistic
ownership of the responsibility for the
population’s health and welfare. This
overlooks the very limited and contradic-
tory conception of individual rights im-
plied, and enhances the power of large
corporations to shape individual behav-
iour to the detriment of health and
wellbeing. Corporate economic impera-
tives extending alcohol marketing or
seeking policy influence do not produce,
and never will produce, true harm reduc-
tion positions. This key difference between
alcohol and illegal drugs is being ignored.
Ways Forward, Nationally and
Internationally
A simplistic transfer of definitions of
harm reduction from drugs to alcohol
weakens society’s ability to reduce the
scale of the alcohol problem and to protect
public health. It is thus important to
expose the limitations of the alcohol-
industry-favoured definition. Instead, we
offer a simpler definition of harm reduc-
tion that gets to the heart of the matter.
Put simply, if a policy or programme
reduces harms or problems, then it is harm
reduction. Evidence-based whole-popula-
tion measures to reduce alcohol harm,
including increasing price and reducing
availability, are therefore legitimate and
effective harm reduction measures within
this definition. Civil society must not allow
the concept of harm reduction to be
defined in ways that serve corporate
interests at the expense of public health.
Advocacy inspired by libertarian ideas is
at odds with the evidence on how to
reduce alcohol harms in the population.
‘‘Harm reduction’’, as it has been applied
to alcohol policy, has so far served
corporate rather than public health inter-
ests. Public health approaches recognise
large corporations that produce and sell
drugs such as alcohol as key vectors of the
global burden of disease, whose corporate
social responsibility activities reflect eco-
nomic rather than health or social moti-
vations [52]. Rigorous scrutiny of the
evidence on the scale and nature of
alcohol harms, of the effectiveness of
countermeasures, and of the behaviour of
the alcohol industry is crucial. National
governments need also to resist corporate
efforts to subvert evidence-informed poli-
cies, in order to halt the rising levels of
damage caused by alcohol to public health
and society.
National alcohol policies must therefore
recognise that working in ‘‘partnership’’
with industry has failed to reduce alcohol
harm (as has been recognised in Ireland
[8]); moreover, it is implausible that it ever
could do so, because of an irreconcilable
conflict of interest [53]. The resistance of
the alcohol industry, or, indeed, any other
rational economic actor whose interests
are threatened, is understandable, and the
means used to influence policy are deserv-
ing of in-depth investigation. The alcohol
industry’s favoured definition of harm
reduction actually entails harm promo-
tion, however well-constructed the smo-
kescreen of self-serving ideas. The basis for
action by national governments to regulate
the industry in the public interest is now
available; alcohol harm reduction will be
best achieved by reducing overall con-
sumption through increased price and
reduced availability and marketing, as
the international peer-reviewed evidence
makes abundantly clear [18]. This means
the population, as a whole, drinking less.
National alcohol policies also have
global contexts [12,54,55]. The alcohol
industry is aggressively expanding in low-
and middle-income countries and seeking
to influence national alcohol policies in so
doing [56]. The WHO Global Strategy to
Reduce the Harmful Use of Alcohol [57]
offers a broad-based public health strategic
approach with ten ‘‘target areas’’ for
national policy development. It is entirely
compatible with our proposed definition of
harm reduction, and includes as one target
area ‘‘reducing the harm from alcohol
intoxication and drinking without neces-
sarily affecting the underlying alcohol
consumption…within a broader strategy
that prevents or reduces the negative
consequences of drinking and alcohol
intoxication.’’ [57] All nine other target
areas operate by reducing consumption
via supply- or demand-side mechanisms
(e.g., higher taxes and alcohol advertising
Alcohol harm reduction
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bans). WHO thus regards measures to
make public drinking contexts safer, for
example, as just one element of a broader
public health strategy.
Like corporations in other areas, the
alcohol industry claims a role in policy-
making at the national level in order to
create regulatory environments conducive
to corporate interests [49]. The editors of
the leading journal Addiction have ob-
served: ‘‘It may take decades to reverse the
epidemics of alcohol abuse that emerge
when industry-favourable policies trump
public health initiatives’’ [54]. Margaret
Chan, Director-General of WHO, recent-
ly felt it necessary to restate: ‘‘In the view
of WHO, the alcohol industry has no role
in the formulation of alcohol policies,
which must be protected from distortion
by commercial or vested interests’’ [58].
The stakes are high, and there should be
no scope for ambiguity in alcohol policy
about the role of the industry.
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